Economic and Financial Review
Volume 51

Number 4

Article 6

12-2013

Domestic Credit Growth and International Capital Flows:
Implications for Monetary Policy Management in Nigeria
Moses K. Tule
Central Bank of Nigeria, mktule@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/efr
Part of the Finance Commons

Recommended Citation
Tule, M. K. (2013). Domestic Credit Growth and International Capital Flows: Implications for Monetary
Policy Management in Nigeria. CBN Economic and Financial Review. 51(4), 97-127.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economic and Financial Review by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact dc@cbn.gov.ng.

Domestic Credit Growth and International Capital
Flows: Implications for Monetary Policy
Management in Nigeria
Moses K. Tule
I.

T

Introduction

he financial crises of the last three decades have spurred interest in the
dynamics of international capital flows. A number of studies have examined
the behaviour of net capital flows, namely the difference between the
foreign purchase of domestic assets (or capital inflows by foreigners) and the
domestic purchase of foreign assets (or capital outflows by domestic agents).
However, the literature is scanty about the individual behaviour of these two
components on net capital flows.
Foreign capital flows, i.e. Foreign Direct Investment, FDI, (investment in real assets)
and Foreign Portfolio Investment (investment in financial assets) often come in
waves. During the 2008 global financial crisis, two key contributory factors that
were identified in the crisis were the balance sheet problems associated with
rapid credit growth in some countries (most obviously, Ireland and Spain) during
the pre-crisis period and excessive external imbalances (Lane and McQuade,
2013) . Easy availability of credit in the U.S., fueled by large inflows of foreign funds
after the Russian debt crisis and Asian financial crisis of the 1997–1998 periods, led
to a housing construction boom and facilitated debt-financed consumer
spending. Lax lending standards and rising real estate prices also contributed to
the real estate bubble. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit card, and
auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt
load. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) have documented that the
variation in the size of recessions during 2008-2009, was significantly related to the
scale of credit growth during the 2003-2008 period and the size of outstanding
current account imbalances.
In related study, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) show that above-normal current
account deficits during the pre-crisis period was significantly associated with
major declines in domestic demand and sharp reversals in private capital flows
over 2008-2010. Foreign capital inflows, in principle, are necessary because they
complement the domestic resources of the economy and enhance economic
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development. Hence, capital flows could contribute to amplifying economic
cycles, fuel credit booms, appreciating the exchange rate, and could be subject
to sudden reversals (Calvo, et al., 2008). For capital-scarce developing countries
like Nigeria, off-shore capital inflows are desirable as they help to stimulate
investment, employment and growth.
Ernst and Young (2013) showed that Nigeria has consistently ranked among the
largest recipient of foreign capital in Africa, particularly FDI, over the last decade
with amount totaling about US$120 billion. It further estimated that FDI inflows to
Nigeria will average about US$23 billion per annum over the next five years. A
spectra of variables which had helped to shore up the growth of foreign investor
activity in the country, included improved international perception of the
country‘s strong macroeconomic performance, debt relief, the global
commodity (particularly oil) boom, improved governance situation and political
stability (Ernst and Young, 2013). Liberalisation of the foreign exchange market
and the lifting of restrictions on investors had also encouraged the entry of foreign
investors into government and corporate debt market, equities, and money
market instruments.
The growth in the number of Pan-African funds primarily established to satisfy the
demand for Nigerian and sub-Sahara African exposure to foreign investors is
another important factor. The shift towards portfolio flows shows the growing
prominence of this source of external funding, as institutional investors search for
better yields in Nigerian and other frontier markets‘ treasury bills, bonds, equities
and currencies and, as against the unattractive interest rate regime prevailing in
developed markets.
The demand for Nigeria‘s local debt by foreign institutional investors has
remained high since October 2011 due to the high yields that have averaged 15
per cent over the last 3 years. The enabling regulatory environment and
willingness of the Federal government to guarantee infrastructural bonds, has
attracted even higher foreign portfolio capital inflows into the country. Thus, while
foreign capital provides an important source of external financing for the country,
especially in supporting domestic investment, the economy could be vulnerable
to the volatile and speculative nature of such short-term portfolio capital flows,
which are potentially injurious to macroeconomic management and are a major
source of financial instability. Private capital inflows, which go to private sector
agents, could reverse at the shortest notice, given an external shock or investor
pessimism about the state of the macroeconomy.
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The volatility in short-term capital flows became clearly manifest during the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, when foreign investors pulled out of Nigeria and
other frontiers markets‘ equities. This led to a loss of over 50 per cent of the value
in many of these markets – a loss far higher than the loss recorded in the less open
BRIC markets, particularly China and India.
Foreign capital inflows have the capacity to crowd out domestic investment;
thus, making growth less sustainable compared with growth driven by domestic
investment resources. While the analysis of the existence and extent of the
spillovers of international capital flows to domestic credit has been done, such
studies with empirical content on the impact on domestic credit for developing
economies like Nigeria are still evolving. Against this background, this paper
addresses four questions: how important and what is the structure, size and
composition of international capital flows to Nigeria?; does international capital
flow produce significant spill-over effects on domestic credit supply?; what is the
relationship between international capital flow and domestic credit growth?; and
what should be the reaction of the monetary authority to managing international
capital flow risks? It is pertinent to state that the macroeconomic policy
framework and its credibility are important for managing risks from rapid capital
inflows and possible reversals. This paper investigates the effect of foreign capital
flows on domestic credit growth, specifically, and its implication for monetary
policy. The paper is structured into 6 sections. Section 2 provides the review of
related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 provides stylized facts on
the structure and changing structure of domestic credit and international capital
flows in Nigeria while section 4 deals with capital flows and the dynamics of
monetary policy in Nigeria. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis, while section
6 concludes the study.

II.

Review of Related Theoretical and Empirical Literature

II.1

Theoretical Literature

The theoretical link between international capital flows and bank credit can be
found in the context of the lending or boom-bust cycles following McKinnon and
Pill (1996) and Giannetti (2007) as well as Daniel and Jones (2007) which brought
to the fore the issue of financial globalisation, including liberalisation of the
current account. Given the financial intermediation role of the banking system,
an immediate impact could be, for instance, a precipitation of banking crises
with attendant distortions to investment flow.
As it would become evident from the empirical perspective, lending booms are
orchestrated by episodes of increased capital inflows; and huge credit
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expansions are associated with financial liberalisation processes (domestic and
international). Caballero (2010) opined ―that after a liberalisation process a surge
in capital inflows may take place during … early stages of financial development,
allowing banks a bigger pool of funds from which to provide lending, but at the
same time magnifying the moral hazard and incentives problems in the banking
industry‖.
Although these theoretical constructs are largely intuitive, an extension to the
literature has been prompted due to the opaque nature of some of the empirical
evidence in aiding our understanding of the nexus between international capital
and domestic credit expansion. Such areas of extension as in Caballero (2010)
are the apparent difficulty of empirics to offer strong evidence that surges in
capital flows are systematically associated with lending booms. Its inability to
suggest a direct link between the level of capital flows and domestic credit
growth; which kind of capital flows are associated with credit growth; and do not
attempt to identify surges in capital. Intuitively some studies link banking
vulnerabilities to surges in capital flows, a fundamental theoretical channel with
the view to identifying country-specific excessive capital surges.
The international capital flows literature is widespread and of different dimensions.
It is evident as Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) and Cardarelli et al., (2010) showed
that the periods of high capital inflow coincided with incidences of higher
macroeconomic volatility. Furceri et al., (2011), Caballero (2010), Reinhart and
Reinhart (2009) and Edwards (2007) also noted the amplified risk of financial and
balance of payments fragility. Linking high capital flow episodes with credit and
asset prices, Mendoza and Torrones (2008) showed its likely effect of engendering
credit and asset price booms. Such studies such as Borio and Disyatat (2011),
Gourinchas (2012), Obstfeld (2012a, 2012b) found that international capital
inflows have a tremendous impact on the funding environment and alters the
portfolio mix of financial assets of domestic banks and non-banks.
Furceri et al., (2011b) investigated the effect of capital inflow shocks on the
growth of domestic credit using panel data of developed and emerging
economies from 1970 to 2007. The study found that in the two years following the
start of a capital inflow shock, the credit-to-GDP ratio rises by about 2
percentage points. They showed that this trend would reverse in the mediumterm with the ratio declining by almost 4 percentage points, seven years after the
initial shock. The paper found that the effect is different depending on the type of
flows characterising the episode (debt vs. portfolio equity vs. FDI), with large
capital inflows that are debt-driven having the largest effect. The paper
suggested that the short-term effect of capital inflow shocks on domestic credit
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depends on countries‘ macroeconomic policy stances. In particular, the study
found that this effect is lower in countries with higher real exchange rate flexibility
and fiscal policy counter-cyclicality.
Borio and Disyatat (2011) approached the issue of capital flows and credit
growth by a re-examination of the view that current account surpluses in several
emerging market economies drive credit booms and risk-taking in the major
advanced deficit countries at the heart of the crisis, by significantly subduing
world interest rates and/or by funding the booms in such countries. Consequently,
they conjectured that the main contributing factor to the financial crisis was not
―excess saving‖ but the ―excess elasticity‖ of the international monetary and
financial system: the monetary and financial regimes in place were unable to
curtail the accumulation of unsustainable credit and asset price booms
(―financial imbalances‖). Thus, the authors identify credit creation, which
characterises a monetary economy as playing a fundamental role as a
mechanism of the transmission of international capital inflows to the domestic
economy.
Specifically, the literature highlighted the link between international capital flows
and domestic credit. To resolve whether surges in international capital flows are
linked with a higher probability of banking crises, and if it could happen through a
lending boom channel, Caballero (2010) found by applying data for over one
hundred countries during 1973-2008 that episodes of higher surges in the previous
year strongly propagate systemic banking crises and it was three times higher in
the contemporaneous year. The author found that for intense surges they
operated through a mechanism other than lending booms. However, mild surges
that result in crises were shown to be mainly through their association with lending
booms. The study found that capital flow surges in both debt and portfolio-equity
flows are associated with future crises although, portfolio flows produce a higher
chance of a crisis.
Lane and McQuade (2013) showed that the main covariation pattern is between
net international debt flows and domestic credit growth, noting that international
equity flows were inconsequential channel of impact to the domestic economy.
Luca and Spatafora (2012) found that both net capital flows and domestic credit
benefitted from reductions in the global price risk and low interest rates. They
noted also that greater domestic credit as capital inflow surge could increase the
extent to which capital inflow transmit beneficially into the domestic economy.
Indeed, Shin (2012) showed that movement of capital between Europe and the
United States was responsible for the US credit boom in the mid-2000s. This point
was similarly underscored by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), where they
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highlighted the role of cross-border internal funding in determining the behaviour
of global banks.
Bruno and Shin (2012) examined the relationship between international bankingsector flows and domestic private credit, noting that global liquidity and the
leverage cycle of global banks as a key driver of credit growth in the countries
that the authors studied. Jorda, et al. (2011) found that time was of paramount
importance in the international capital flows and domestic credit growth
dynamics, noting that although the bilateral correlation between credit growth
and the current account was less important historically, it turned significant after
1975.
According to Magud, et al (2012) capital flow surges have frequently resulted in
dramatic credit expansions in the advanced and emerging market economies.
Analysing the effect of exchange rate elasticity on credit markets in episodes of
huge capital inflows, the authors found that bank credit expands more swiftly in
the emerging markets. Their findings showed that credit composition inclines to
foreign currency in economies with relative rigid exchange rate regimes, and not
predicated on whether the latter attract more capital inflows than economies
with more flexible regimes. This point to the fact that countries with relatively rigid
exchange rate regimes might benefit more from regulatory policies that
streamline banks‘ incentives to access external markets and to lend/borrow in
foreign currency. Some of such policies according to the author include
―marginal reserve requirements on foreign lending, currency-dependent liquidity
requirements, and higher capital requirement and/or dynamic provisioning on
foreign exchange loans‖.
The literature, however, is salient on how monetary policy should react to
managing capital flow risks in an oil rich environment, since it is very clear that
there are country-specific peculiarities. In addition, for a developing country like
Nigeria, it is not clear whether such spillovers produce significant influence on
domestic credit as studies in this area is still scanty and evolving. The empirical
evidence is still inconclusive on whether the relationship between international
capital flow and domestic credit growth holds conventionally. It is obvious that
domestic policy conditions could blur this link and assuming this possibility away
could be misleading.

II.2

Theoretical Framework

The extent of integration of international capital markets influences researchers‘
view of the global economy and how economic convergence has evolved or
might yet proceed. Capital is believed to always flow in the direction of large
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profit differentials, and economists suggest that the evidence of interest arbitrage
provides the evidence for perfect capital mobility. Thus, for an open economy,
capital would always move in the direction of highest profit margin.
Inflows from abroad are a normal and necessary part of economic activity
because financial intermediation between lenders and borrowers improves the
efficiency of resource allocation and growth. The economic rationale for
investing overseas is that investors could earn a higher economic return than the
cost of invested funds and that these economic returns are then translated into
financial returns. Foreign inflow problems for governments arise if the absorption
capacity of the capital receiving country does not keep pace with growth in
capital flows, leading to shocks to the domestic economy.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) observed that, if domestic savings were added to a
world saving pool and domestic investment competed for funds in that same
world savings pool, there would be no correlation between a nation‘s savings
rate and its rate of investment. The statistical evidence showed that, on the
contrary, the long-term saving and investment rates of the individual industrialised
countries in the OECD were highly correlated. The data were consistent with the
view that a sustained one-percentage-point increase in the savings rate induced
nearly a one-percentage-point increase in the investment rate. They found that
domestic investment and saving rates were highly correlated. Their result focused
on a strong condition for perfect capital mobility: if national saving declined, it
should not necessarily ―crowd out‖ domestic investment if the current account
were able to take up the slack through capital inflows.
From the literature, four major approaches have been used to explain the
theoretical basis for capital flows. They are the Mundell-Fleming model, the
Current Account Models and Saving-Investment Balance and the Absorption
approach. We rely specifically on the Current Account Models and SavingInvestment Balance in the balance of payments framework, to generate the
theoretical basis for this study.
The balance of payments comprises the current account, capital account plus
the monetary account (changes in reserve assets) which is really a settlement
account of the above two. The current account represents payments related to
current economic activities such as output, consumption, investment,
employment, use of capital, etc. It is the sum of trade in goods and services,
factor payments across countries (wage, interest, rent, dividend), and unilateral
transfers (ODA grants, workers‘ remittances, gifts, among others). The capital
account on the other hand, deals with payments related to transfers. The current
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account plus the capital account makes up the overall balance which shows the
sum of all autonomous transactions (both private and official), which may be
positive or negative. Generally, a current account surplus means that a country is
producing more than it spends. It exports more than it imports, so the country is a
net lender to the world. Conversely, a current account deficit means a country‘s
spending exceeds its output i.e. imports are greater than exports, and the country
is borrowing from the world. There are about four methods in the literature for
determining the current account i.e. inter-temporal optimisation model;
absorption approach; saving-investment balance approach and elasticities
approach. However, the analysis in this study would be limited to two of these
approaches - absorption approach and savings-investment balance approach.

II.2.1

Absorption Approach

The absorption approach is a macroeconomic-oriented approach which relies
on macroeconomic identities. Its strength is simplicity and practicality, while the
weakness is the lack of deep theoretical foundation. However, it is more useful for
looking at the real conditions of a country.
Given the national income identity:
(Y: income, C: private consumption, I: private investment, G: government
spending, X: exports and M: imports)
…
Equation 2, the so called ―domestic demand" or "absorption" identity.
The current account
is
(here, we ignore other items in the current
account like ODA grants, factor income, etc).
From 4, we can see that
or simply,
The current account is an excess of a nation's production (=income Y) over
absorption (=domestic demand or A). Y is what the country produces, A is what it
spends (for consumption and investment), and the gap is CA.
Current account (
a

) surplus means the country is saving part of its income, and

deficit means it overspends its income. If a country is experiencing a

deficit, there are only two solutions provided by this model: increase Y or
decrease A. Increasing Y is a supply-side problem. The IMF position is that
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economic liberalisation (free trade, privatisation, deregulation, among others)
would favour private sector investment and boost output.
Decreasing A is a demand-side problem. Usually, it means austerity--tight budget
and tight money. This is the most traditional IMF conditionality. Thus, the classical
solution is macroeconomic adjustment combined with economic liberalisation.

II.2.2

Saving-Investment Balance Approach

The saving-investment approach is very similar to the absorption approach,
because it is based on one macroeconomic-oriented additional simple identity.
Recall the previous national income identity on the expenditure side:
To this, we add the national income identity on the disposal side (how people
earn income and allocate it to different uses):
(S: saving, and T: taxes)
This says that income is divided into consumption, saving and taxes. Combining
equations 1 and 2, we have:

Equation 3 is an identity.
is identically equal to net private
saving
plus net government saving
) . The current account is the net
savings of the two sectors combined. According to this view, a CA deficit means
that either the private sector or the government (or both) have negative savings
(called dissaving). In many cases, the government overspends its budget.
Alternatively, maybe both sectors are dissaving (i.e., suffer from savings shortage).
There are two possible ways to reduce the deficit in the current account:
increase net private savings or increase net government savings. To increase net
private savings (S - I), discouraging investment is generally undesirable (unless
there is an investment bubble). The better solution is to encourage private
savings. Various institutional adjustments (tax system, banking, housing, pension,
social security and insurance, among others, could be carried out to strengthen
incentives to save and remove incentives to consume more. To increase net
government savings
), taxes must go up to increase revenue or a cut in
expenditure is desirable.
In a closed economy, the national return on additional savings is the domestic
marginal product of capital. The question of whether the government should
pursue policies to increase the savings rate is therefore equivalent to deciding
whether this domestic marginal product of capital offers a high enough reward
to justify postponing consumption. Although taxes on capital income could
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reduce the net yield that individual investors receive, the country as a whole
receives both the after-tax yield and the tax revenue; it is this pre-tax marginal
product of capital that should influence national saving policy in a closed
economy.
In contrast, if capital is perfectly mobile between countries, most of any
incremental saving will leave the home country (if it is already a capital exporter)
or will replace other foreign source capital that would otherwise be invested in
the home country (if it is already a capital importer). In this case, the yield to the
home country on the additional savings is only the net-of-tax return received by
the investor and not the pre-tax marginal product of capital. On the other hand,
the foreign governments collect the additional tax revenue, if the additional
savings is invested abroad. If the additional savings reduces capital imports into
the home country, the tax revenue of the domestic government remains
unchanged and national income rises only by the after-tax returns.
From the model, fixing the so-called investment-savings mismatch would require
capital inflow from abroad to finance investment activity or to supplement
domestic savings. Most developing economies view the need to attract foreign
capital to supplement domestic resources as significant, in view of growing
mismatch between their capital requirements and saving capacity. For many of
them, foreign capital is a key element in their development strategy against the
other forms of foreign financing like debt.

II.2.3

The Mundell-Fleming Model

The Mundell-Fleming model is an extension of the IS-LM model. Whereas the
traditional IS-LM Model deals with economy under autarky (or a closed
economy); the Mundell-Fleming model describes an open economy. Unlike IS-LM
model which shows the relationship between interest rate and output in the short
run, the Mundell-Fleming model portrays the relationship between the nominal
exchange rate and an economy's output.
The model argues that an economy cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed
exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary policy.
The literature refers to this principle as ―the Unholy Trinity," the "Irreconcilable
Trinity," the "Inconsistent trinity" or the Mundell-Fleming "trilemma.". From the
Mundell–Fleming model, when the global interest rate increases above the
domestic rate, capital flows out to take advantage of this opportunity. The
traditional model relies on the following equations:
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,
is consumption,
is net exports.
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is government spending and

=
Where
is

is money supply,

Where

is average price,

is the current account and

is liquidity, is the interest rate and

, the capital account.

IS Components

(

)

Where
is consumption,
expected rate of inflation.

(

is

,

is taxes,

is the interest rate,

)

Where
is investment,
is the interest rate,
inflation,
is GDP in the previous period.
Where

is the

is the expected rate of

is government spending, an exogenous variable.

Where
is net exports,
a foreign country.

is the real exchange rate,

is GDP,

is the GDP of

BoP Components
Where,

is the current account and

is net exports.

Where the level of capital mobility, is the interest rate,
is the foreign interest
rate, is capital investments not related to an exogenous variable.
, is the
capital account.
An increase in the global interest rate under flexible exchange rate regime would
cause an upward pressure on the local interest rate. The pressure subsides as the
local rate closes in on the global rate. When a positive differential between the
global and the local rate occurs, holding the LM curve constant, capital flows out
of the local economy. This depreciates the local currency and helps boost net
exports. Increasing net exports shift the IS curve to the right. This shift continues to
the right until the local interest rate becomes as high as the global rate. A
decrease in global interest rate causes the reverse to occur.
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Structure and Dynamics of Credit and International Capital Flows in
Nigeria

According to Broner et al., (2013a), gross capital flows, i.e. capital inflows by
foreigners and capital outflows by domestic agents, are large and volatile both in
absolute terms and relative to the size and volatility of net capital flows. While the
size and volatility of net capital flows have remained unevenly constant over the
last decades, both have increased significantly over time for gross capital flows
reflecting an increasingly positive correlation between capital inflows by
foreigners and capital outflows by domestic agents (Broner et al., 2013b). The
literature has established that capital inflows are pro-cyclical and that related
retrenchment towards home financial markets is particularly acute during crisis
associated with information asymmetry of both foreign investors and domestic
agents. The retrenchment during crises (banking, currency, and debt) affected
all types of gross capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and
portfolio investment (PI). However, reserves play an important role in the
contraction of capital flows in low –income countries (Broneretal., 2013b).
Dell‘Erba and Reinhardt (2013) suggested that unlike other sectors of an
economy, FDI surges in the financial sector are accompanied by a boom-bust
cycle in GDP growth and driven largely by global and contagion factors. They
emphasised that financial-sector FDI is a less safe capital flow than other types of
FDI contrary to other literature on the impact of capital controls such as Magud
et al. (2011), which claimed that a shift in the composition towards FDI has been
beneficial with respect to the riskiness of a country‘s external balance sheet.
Furthermore, they argued that regulations restricting lending and borrowing in
foreign currencies, reducing the prospect of surges in financial-sector FDI, might
have implications for the design of future prudential regulation policies.

III.I

Structure and Dynamics of Domestic Credit

Relative to other economies during the crisis years, there have being
consolidation of loans to the private sector segment in Nigeria, from N2,303.70
billion or 52.1 per cent of GDP in 2006Q2 to N15,692.03 billion or 153.8 per cent of
GDP in 2013Q2. However, credit to the Federal Government dropped by –
N2,758.31 billion, from N360.79 billion or 8.15 of GDP to a deficit of N2,397.52 billion
or -23.49 per cent of GDP in the same period. In the peak years of the crisis, there
was an increase in government lending, given its consistent budget deficits and
the reluctance of banks to lend to businesses to minimise bad loans. But in recent
years, government lending has decreased owing to increased government
borrowing in foreign markets.
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Table 1: Dynamics and Structure of Domestic Credit in Nigeria
N'Billion
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Domestic Credit
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2

%GDP

Of which, granted:
Fed Govt
% GDP

Private Sector

%GDP

2,598.85

65.49

471.89

11.89

2,126.96

53.60

2,664.49

60.20

360.79

8.15

2,303.70

52.05

2,336.53

46.86

-235.14

-4.72

2,571.68

51.57

714.21

13.83

-1,936.62

-37.49

2,650.82

51.32

540.32

11.40

-2,508.63

-52.92

3,048.94

64.31

888.71

18.31

-2,615.01

-53.88

3,503.72

72.18

1,740.31

31.50

-2,462.86

-44.58

4,203.17

76.08

2,688.24

48.54

-2,368.48

-42.77

5,056.72

91.30

3,462.33

62.54

-2,502.00

-45.20

5,964.33

107.74

4,038.24

70.60

-2,716.45

-47.49

6,754.68

118.08

4,244.63

65.69

-3,230.04

-49.99

7,474.67

115.67

4,951.86

75.28

-3,107.69

-47.24

8,059.55

122.52

4,620.52

84.61

-3,605.92

-66.03

8,226.44

150.65

5,406.93

92.07

-3,150.02

-53.64

8,556.94

145.71

6,854.25

103.72

-2,957.11

-44.75

9,811.36

148.47

7,917.04

115.54

-2,302.29

-33.60

10,219.34

149.14

8,401.20

113.12

-1,649.47

-22.21

10,050.67

135.33

8,612.94

107.08

-1,489.88

-18.52

10,102.82

125.61

9,309.84

102.81

-1,026.28

-11.33

10,336.11

114.14

8,708.55

92.06

-1,121.80

-11.86

9,830.34

103.92

8,206.79

95.94

-1,240.16

-14.50

9,446.95

110.44

8,889.64

94.12

-1,068.31

-11.31

9,957.95

105.43

9,962.53

101.08

-1,148.21

-11.65

11,110.74

112.73

13,686.73

143.24

-496.86

-5.20

14,183.59

148.44

13,679.08

149.61

-440.81

-4.82

14,119.89

154.44

13,567.43

137.88

-1,133.63

-11.52

14,701.06

149.40

13,376.40

121.97

-1,377.60

-12.56

14,754.00

134.53

13,782.53

130.10

-1,353.19

-12.77

15,135.71

142.87

12,740.97

134.20

-2,520.97

-26.55

15,261.94

160.76

13,294.51

130.28

-2,397.52

-23.49

15,692.03

153.77

Source: Authors' calculation based on CBN Monetary Survey for various years.

III.1.1 Dynamics of Total Domestic Credit
In absolute terms, the total domestic credit rose by N10,630.02 billion, from
N2,664.49 billion or 60.2 per cent of GDP in 2006Q2 to N13,294.51 billion or 130.3
per cent of GDP in 2013Q2. Reasons for the increase was attributed to CBN‘s
policies which promoted certainty in macroeconomic management and its
interventions programmes such as funding of DFIs (Bank of Industry, among
others) and establishment of Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria
(AMCON) that enabled banks to regain financial capacity for credit.
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Figure 1: Total Domestic Credit in Nigeria, percentage of GDP (2006Q1– 2013Q2)
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The dynamic nature of domestic credit is relatively strong compared with the
period up to 2009. Although higher than the value at the beginning of the crisis,
total domestic credit recorded contraction of 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2010
compared to 31.9 per cent of GDP in 2009. Following the crisis period when the
intermediary role of banks experienced decline, their lending capacity
maintained a value above N13, 500 billion in 2011 and 2012.

III.1.2 Dynamics of Capital Flows: Stylized Facts
Nigeria has gradually been opening up its capital account, with increase in
capital flows reflecting liberalisation and a relatively easy restrictive environment.
One major factor for increase in private inflows is financial stability brought about
by reform and improved macroeconomic environment. Moreover, a number of
emerging and developing economies appeared relatively insulated from the first
round effects of the crises that engulfed major financial centres and ‗temporary
safe havens‘ for international capital flows to take advantage of interest
differentials.
With the financial reforms and macroeconomic stability, Nigeria has continued to
receive substantial inflows in the form of portfolio inflows as investment in the
bonds and equities markets since 2004. During the crisis period in 2008, inflows
slightly recessed but recovered in 2010. The direction of net capital flows depends
on many factors. Prasad and Rajan (2008) pointed to a variety of factors that
make impact of capital account liberalisation less predictable. Some
determinants of net flows are the domestic business cycle, growth prospects,
world business cycle and financial sector liberalisation ( Bayoumi and Ohnsorge,
2013).
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Capital flows to Nigeria, measured by current account balance, decreased by
US$1,902.71million or 23.7 per cent of GDP, from a surplus of US$8,039.23million or
21.7 per cent of GDP in 2007Q1 to US$6,136.52 million or 10.2per cent of GDP in
2013Q1.From 2007Q1 until 2013Q3, the current account averaged surplus of
US$4,795.9 million, reaching a high of US$8,910.46 million in 2008Q4 and a
negative of US$3,862.83 million in 2011Q3. During the crisis years, the capital flows
slowed, averaging US$3,355.10million or 5.8 per cent and US$2,190.20million or 3.8
per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively, compared with US$7.324.08 million on
average or 8.6 per cent of GDP in 2009. Following improved macroeconomic
performance and positive external developments, capital flows in Nigeria
recovered to average of US$5,107.09 million or 7.8 per cent of GDP in 2012.

Table 2: Capital Flows in Nigeria, 2007Q1 – 2013Q2
Capital Inflows in Nigeria, US$ Million (2007Q1 - 2013Q2 )
2007
2008
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Foreign Direct Investment 667.88 1,070.11 1,689.54 854.05 1,225.24 1,746.31 712.43 977.30
Equity 643.89 1,068.09 1,684.53 847.02 1,188.52 1,725.88 706.95 976.33
Other capital 23.99 2.02 5.01
7.02 36.71 20.44 5.49
0.97
Portfolio Investment
469.63 681.62 970.97 1,572.25 1,562.42 744.73 638.21 484.34
Equity 337.25 271.36 786.08 1,093.77 892.02 457.53 516.77 483.64
Bonds 131.52 410.00 116.90 399.68 307.57 60.16 52.32
Money Mkt Instrumts 0.86 0.26 68.00 78.80 362.82 227.04 69.12 0.70
Other Investments
361.62 275.59 341.31 618.61 1,436.02 803.10 538.48 301.11
Trade credits 82.72 15.00
Loans 350.45 275.51 339.93 535.50 1,348.22 593.47 492.78 301.11
Currency deposits Other claims 11.17 0.08 1.37
0.39 87.80 194.63 45.70
Current Account Balance 8,039.23 9,213.47 1,300.29 9,327.54 8,447.46 9,681.33 1,366.32 9,801.19

Intl. Investment Position
Assets
Liabilities
Net

Q1
1,451.34
1,449.69
1.65
286.54
285.14
1.40
84.52
84.52
4,029.34

2009
Q2 Q3
Q4
793.70 424.16 657.19
793.17 412.26 650.56
0.53 11.91
6.64
451.10 451.23 351.14
408.23 401.23 348.64
12.62 30.25 50.00
2.50
187.51 258.44 306.02
7.41 0.51
179.90 252.74 299.51
3.20
6.00
0.20 2.51
4,617.88 651.72 4,675.05

Q1
73.93
66.43
7.50
1,052.18
927.58
124.60
633.97
633.27
0.70
1,360.84

2010
2011
2012
2013
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
212.21 299.29 143.50 553.73 469.53 340.18 389.90 524.76 214.24 421.16 839.71 561.42 400.91
197.17 294.28 110.46 536.76 427.34 177.46 357.34 512.26 195.36 412.06 812.33 541.31 400.80
15.04 5.01 33.04 16.97 42.20 162.72 32.56 12.51 18.89 9.10 27.37 20.11 0.11
820.05 903.01 1,091.67 1,015.09 1,364.12 1,094.65 1,039.26 2,955.64 2,301.56 3,413.90 4,816.41 5,750.51 4,487.50
580.58 631.95 842.89 940.30 1,068.32 812.12 870.77 2,634.50 1,991.04 2,982.28 4,213.00 4,930.55 3,934.21
0.07
0.10 13.30 33.75 19.34 74.41 131.81 10.16 368.80 599.42 150.74
239.40 271.06 248.78 74.69 282.51 248.78 149.15 246.74 178.71 421.46 234.61 220.54 402.55
307.54 297.93 160.42 238.11 732.21 176.92 490.06 135.81 315.93 288.40 388.39 288.64 729.25
0.15
1.37 43.67
0.87
306.54 297.32 160.35 213.74 732.21 176.92 488.42 85.45 315.06 277.54 355.07 286.27 690.61
30.03 1.73
1.00 0.45
0.07 24.37
0.27 6.69 0.87 9.99 3.29 0.64 38.64
3,705.43 1,941.34 6,412.79 4,716.87 5,413.99 (3,862.83) 2,492.76 4,601.06 1,987.76 8,910.46 4,929.08 6,136.52 N/A

77,498.53

88,463.64

83,928.45

83,668.50

101,690.91

N/A

66,289.60
11,208.93

75,622.12
12,841.52

84,652.42
(723.97)

94,054.42
(10,385.92)

106,420.90
(4,729.99)

N/A
-

Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin for various years

In terms of the composition of capital inflows, FDI declined by US$266.97 million,
from US$667.88 million or 1.8 per cent of GDP in 2007Q1 to US$400.91 million or 0.6
per cent of GDP in 2013Q2. Although FDI value has recovered to an average of
US$499.92 million or 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2012, from the crisis period of US$182.23
million average or 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2010, it remained modest compared
with the pre-crisis period. In contrast, portfolio investment increased by
US$9,719.31million, from US$3,694.47million or 2.3 per cent in 2007 to US$13,413.78
million or 5.6 per cent of GDP in 2012. Portfolio investment (PI) share of private
capital flows to Nigeria has been on a phenomenal increase that by 2010, PI has
surpassed every other type of capital inflows into Nigeria with FDI and Trade
Credits declining in absolute terms. This is attributable to the positive effect of the
CBN‘s policy on foreign investment in short-term instruments and the relatively
high yield on those instruments.
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Given these developments, Nigeria‘s net international investment position has
recovered significantly by -US$15,938.92million, from US$11,208.93million or 25.7
per cent of GDP in 2007 to negative of US$4,729.99million or -7.8 per cent of GDP
in 2011, reflecting an increase in external financial liabilities of the economy.
During the crisis period, the net international investment position declined to
negative of US$10,385.92million or -16.5 per cent of GDP in 2010.

IV.

Empirical Presentation and Analysis

IV.1

Methodology

This section presents the data sources and methodology adopted. Domestic
credit growth was measured as the quarterly ratio of credit to private sector to
GDP. In terms of aggregate net flows, the current account balance (CAB) was
included. Aggregate net flows between net debt flows and net equity flows were
splitted. Quarterly data from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2013
was used. In relation to other possible covariates of domestic credit growth, net
domestic credit was examined, which was taken from the Central Bank of
Nigeria‘s Monetary Survey. The data were sourced mainly from the Central Bank
of Nigeria.
A dummy variable (E) was constructed to capture the role of net flows. The
deviation of the credit to GDP ratio from its historical trend was used, where the
dummy takes a value of 1, if the trend deviation is higher than the standard
deviation of the de-trended levels. The trend level is obtained using the HodrickPrescott (HP) Filter, while the trend deviation is the standard deviation of the
trend. Essentially, this measure captures the impact of large episodes of inflow on
the change in the credit to GDP ratio and in particular, how persistent changes in
the credit ratio had been. The study adopted the ordinary least square estimation
method for the empirical analysis. Prior to estimation, unit root tests were
conducted to test for the statistical properties of the data by leveraging on the
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, for the existence of unit roots. Using cointegration technique the study assessed the long-run stability of the model. The
study used two measures of domestic credit namely; the ratio of private sector
credit to GDP and net domestic credit. Capital flows was measured by current
account balance (CAB), foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio
investment (FPI). Net debt and net equity flows were removed because of
incomplete data series.

IV.2

Estimation Technique and Model Specification

The literature on capital flows contains three main classes of models explored to
investigate the impact of foreign capital inflows on domestic credit. They include
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the multi-equation model; vector auto-regressive (VAR) models and simple linear
models. Estimations based on VAR models captured the dynamic inter-relations
between domestic credit growth and international capital flows. As Okpanachi
(2012) observed, VAR based and other multi-equation models typically
endogenise capital flows (Christensen, 2004) and other variables that may not in
reality belong to the system (Kwack 2001, Glick and Hutchison, 2000).

IV.2.1 The Model
In the wake of rising capital inflows and the possibilities of sudden stops,
borrowing in the international credit markets by credit creating institutions to lend
in the domestic credit markets to close the loan gap, has become a sort of a
concern in the macro-prudential literature. Although, it is not yet established if
Nigerian banks are hugely leverage to foreign institutions and it is not in doubt
that capital flows in addition to other market related factors constitute drivers of
domestic credit expansion. In Nigeria, monetisation of oil receipts impact
domestic liquidity through the creation of net foreign assets, and in recent times,
the country has received significant inflows that require the understanding of their
impact on credit growth. Overleveraging of domestic financial institutions could
result in a financial crisis in the face of sudden capital reversals prompting
corrective measures and the placement of trigger thresholds such as cap on
credit to GDP ratio for policy interventions. Thus, following Lane and Mcquade
(2012), this study specify the credit cycle to include both short-and long- run
dynamics of relevant capital inflow variables such as FDI, FPI and CAB given the
observed link between capital flows and domestic credit growth. Other factors
include money supply, output growth and GDP per capita. This paper adopts the
single equation approach given the generally unidirectional causality of other
factors to credit to GDP ratio and the near absence spillover of capital flows and
domestic credit growth. Other factors include: money supply, output growth, and
GDP per capita. This paper adopts the single equation approach, given the
generally unidirectional causality of other factors to credit to GDP ratio and the
near-absence spillover of credit to other economies as a small open price taking
country. The algebraic representation of the model is of the form:

∑
Where,
is the level of domestic credit to the private sector (expressed as a
ratio of GDP), NDC is net domestic credit, and measures of international financial
flows (
), namely, current account balance (
), foreign direct
investment (
) and foreign portfolio investment (
). The inclusion of the
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lagged level of credit
and the lagged level of GDP per capita
is to capture convergence dynamics.

IV.3

Empirical Analysis
Table 1: Correlation Results
CPGDP

CPGDP

LFDI

LFPI

LGDPPC

LM2

LNDC

LNGDP

LCAB

1

LFDI

0.031367

1

LFPI

0.734214

0.206404

1

LGDPPC

0.742707

0.354797

0.786981

1

LM2

0.876089

0.262165

0.828028

0.965728

1

LNDC

0.838256

0.12853

0.684737

0.868628

0.899841

1

LNGDP

0.760561

0.343555

0.79846

0.999259

0.971656

0.879068

1

LCAB

0.227888

0.52538

0.403361

0.589264

0.486582

0.375442

0.581177

1

Examining the different measures of capital flows, the correlation analysis shows
that foreign portfolio investment has a significant correlation with ratio of private
credit to GDP (0.73) and net domestic credit (0.68), whereas, the correlation
between foreign direct investment and these same variables were clearly
insignificant recording, (0.03) and (0.13) respectively. The correlation analysis
between foreign direct investment and nominal GDP showed a weak relationship
(0.34). The outcome is in line with the theoretical linkage between credit and
output, suggesting that whatever impacts on credit also affect domestic
production. Another striking feature is the weak correlation pattern observed
between current account balance (CAB) and domestic credit, which suggests
that, unlike other jurisdictions, the CAB, is not a significant determinant of the level
of domestic credit. This result is in tandem with Lane and Mcquade (2012) who in
their study on domestic credit and international capital flows found that the CAB
is inadequate for measuring capital flows.
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Table 2: Unit Root Tests
Variable

Included
Constant
α

Order of Integration

Current Account Balance

First
Difference
-10.75407

Credit to the private sector
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign portfolio investment
GDP Per Capital
Broad Money Supply
Net capital flows
Nominal GDP
Net Domestic Credit
Credit to GDP ratio
Credit to GDP ratio(2)

-4.692426
-4.491409
-6.674672
-2.950762
-8.050618
-3.375716
-7.680868
-4.739160
-5.655079
-3.746064

α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(I)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)

Augmented Dickey Fuller critical values: 1.0 per cent: -3.568308; 5.0 per cent: - 2.921175;
10.0 per cent: -2.598551. The parameter α is the included constant in the ADF model

Table 3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Lags: 2
Null Hypothesis:

Obs

F-Statistic

Prob.

LFDI does not Granger Cause CPGDP

52

0.66582

0.5186

0.96151

0.3897

2.53226

0.0903

0.47075

0.6274

4.27033

0.0198

0.87031

0.4255

2.86434

0.0670

0.87864

0.4221

0.10869

0.8972

3.50102

0.0383

4.27525

0.0197

0.76262

0.4721

CPGDP does not Granger Cause LFDI
LFPI does not Granger Cause CPGDP

52

CPGDP does not Granger Cause LFPI
LGDPPC does not Granger Cause CPGDP

52

CPGDP does not Granger Cause LGDPPC

LM2 does not Granger Cause CPGDP

52

CPGDP does not Granger Cause LM2

LNDC does not Granger Cause CPGDP

52

CPGDP does not Granger Cause LNDC

LNGDP does not Granger Cause CPGDP
CPGDP does not Granger Cause LNGDP

52
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IV.3.1 Time Series Properties
Results from the Granger causality test reveal that one-way causality exists from
foreign portfolio investment, per capita income, money supply and nominal GDP
to credit growth measured by credit to the private sector-GDP ratio. However,
there is no evidence of causality between foreign direct investment and credit to
GDP ratio.
The unit root test using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test shows that all the
variables, namely; current account balance, credit to the private sector, foreign
direct investment, foreign portfolio investment, GDP per capita, broad money
supply, net capital flows, nominal GDP, credit to GDP ratio and credit to the core
private sector to GDP ratio were non-stationary series of order 1 i.e I(1). This implies
that linear combination between credit growth and its determining factors is
stationary, an indication of the existence of a long-run relationship. The intuition of
the unit root results is that credit flows to domestic economy can be explained in
the long-run by these variables and the adjustment process can be represented
by an error correction from where the speed it takes for any distortion in the credit
flows to return to its steady state could be inferred. If this holds, then it is possible
for policy to target the explanatory variables and achieve desired stimuli to
domestic credit conditions.
The result from the Engle-Granger cointegration test confirms that the residuals
generated from the long-run equation (Table 4) is stationary using the ADF-test.
Inclusion of the current account balance (CAB) in the equation yielded no
significance in the error correction model and therefore was excluded from the
static long-run equation to eliminate plausible noise in the final short-run dynamic
model. This is obvious, given that our economy is less dependent on grant inflows
as it is obtainable in other jurisdictions and resource inflow within the period used
are devoid of any sudden shocks. Thus, credit was modeled as an errorcorrection adjustment process that enabled the determination of not only the
short-run dynamics, but also enabled the assessment of the contemporaneous
and long-run impact on credit, arising from both domestic and external factors,
including sources of capital inflows.

IV.3.2 Analysis of the Error-Correction Estimates
Estimates from the static equation suggest the absence of contemporaneous
effects from two measures of international capital flows: foreign direct investment
and foreign portfolio investment that is not significantly different from zero. The
domestic factors, namely, per capita GDP, broad money supply and nominal
GDP show strong significance in explaining the movement in credit. Since the
errors from this equation are mean reverting i.e. being able to return to their
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means after a distortion, a model that includes both dynamic distributed lags of
differenced variables and the long-run variables were estimated to include an
error-correction term.
First, from the short-run dynamic model, the coefficients are semi-elasticities. Aside
the dependent variable, credit to GDP ratio, all other variables were logtransformed. The signs of the variables are appropriate and consistent with
theoretical expectations. All determinants, including the predetermined variable
(lag of credit to GDP ratio), which measures how persistence credit growth has
evolved, were all significant at the 1.0 per cent level.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted on the estimates, by including a dummy (E)
to capture the role of net flows. The dummy variable constructed was by taking
the deviation of the credit to GDP ratio from its historical trend where the dummy
takes a value 1 if the trend deviation is higher than the standard deviation of the
de-trended levels. Essentially, this measure captures the impact of large episodes
of inflow on the change in the credit to GDP ratio and in particular, how
persistent changes in the credit ratio had been. The coefficients are generally
stable and the level of significance remains robust but the dummy was
insignificant. The import of such evidence implies that episodes of large capital
inflows have not been relatively huge and are inconsequential in affecting
domestic credit. It could also mean that the nature of the Federation Account
defines such flows as of a short-term nature when they eventually get deposited
in the DMBs. Perhaps, rather than improve financial intermediation; banks prefer
to invest in short-term government instruments and the CBN standing deposit
facility.
The final model includes both short- and long- run dynamics. The error-correction
coefficient shows a speed of adjustment of 28.0 per cent, which indicate how
much of the disequilibrium that occurs in the previous quarter is corrected
contemporaneously. The adjusted R-squared shows approximately 70.0 per cent
explanatory power of the regressors. The variables are significant at 5.0 per cent,
except foreign direct investment and the dummy. There is a weak form of longrun impact elasticity of foreign direct investment on the credit to GDP ratio.
However, the relationship with FDI is positive.
The short-run effect of foreign portfolio investment is positive suggesting that a 1.0
per cent change in foreign portfolio investment leads to an increase of
approximately 0.00027 per cent in the credit to GDP ratio. This shows that FPI is an
important channel for domestic banks liquidity as this is an important entry
window for foreign investors. The growing patronage of equities and bonds also
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could be a fundamental reason for the significance of the FPI in explaining credit
to GDP ratio. The result also shows that the contemporaneous credit to GDP ratio
changes by 0.0032 per cent following a 1.0 per cent change in its one period
lagged levels. On per capita GDP, its net effect on credit to GDP ratio is negative
and is as much as 0.0033 per cent if it changes by 1.0 per cent. It suggests the
sensitivity of the growth in per capita levels to the demand for bank credit. The
demand for credit tends to be sluggish and elastic as per capita income levels
expand. In terms of short-run effect, broad money supply is positive and a 1.0 per
cent change in its level leads to approximately a change of 0.003 per cent in the
credit to GDP ratio.
The long-run determinants are largely from foreign direct investment, broad
money supply and nominal GDP. A 1 per cent change in the foreign direct
investment results in a 0.00032 per cent change in the credit to GDP ratio in the
long run. For the money supply, the coefficient is positive and results in a 0.001 per
cent change in credit to GDP ratio. Nominal income surprisingly in the long term
negatively influences the credit to GDP ratio to about 0.0012 per cent. However,
it is intuitive to suggest that the level of credit has not expanded at concomitant
pace with the growth in nominal GDP.

Table 4: Static Equation

OLS
(i)

(ii)

LFDI
LFPI
LGDPPC
LM2
LNGDP

-0.0290(0.02)
-0.0240(0.01)
-2.9635(0.74)
0.9102(0.08)
1.9277(0.70)

0.4255
0.1940
0.0002
0.0000
0.0082

C
Observations
R-squared

-11.5535(2.46)

0.0000
54
0.94

Adjusted R0.93
squared
Durbin-Watson
0.63
Dependent variable is CPGDP from 2000Q1 to 2013Q2. The figures in parentheses
are standard errors.
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Table 5: Short-run Dynamic Model

OLS
D(CPGDP(-1))

(i)

(ii)

0.4457 (0.11)

0.0003

D(LFDI(-2))

-0.0086

(0.01)

0.5419

D(LFPI(-4))

0.03120 (0.01)

0.0112

D(LGDPPC)

-0.7723 (0.10)

0.0000

D(LGDPPC(-1))

0.3846 (0.12)

0.0022

D(LM2)

0.3645 (0.06)

0.0000

ECM(-1)

-0.2921 (0.11)

0.0105

Observations
R-squared

49
0.72

Adjusted Rsquared
Durbin-Watson

0.67
1.98

Dependent variable is CPGDP from 2000Q1 to 2013Q2. The figures in parentheses are
standard errors.

Table 6: Short-run Dynamic Model - Sensitivity to Net Flow Episodes
OLS
D(CPGDP(-1))
D(LFDI(-2))
D(LFPI(-4))
D(LGDPPC)
D(LGDPPC(-1))
D(LM2)
E
ECM(-1)
Observations
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
Durbin-Watson

(i)
0.4661 (0.11)
-0.0074
(0.01)
0.0325
(0.01)
-0.7630
(0.11)
0.4027
(0.12)
0.3977 (0.10)
-0.0091 (0.02)
-0.2955 (0.11)
49
0.72
0.67

(ii)
0.0002
0.6225
0.0091
0.0000
0.0025
0.0003
0.6003
0.0104

2.03

Dependent variable is CPGDP from 2000Q1 to 2013Q2. The figures in parentheses are
standard errors.
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Table 7: Short- and Long- run Impact Model
OLS
D(CPGDP(-1))

0.3181

(i)
(0.15)

(ii)
0.0389

D(LFPI(-4))

0.0278

(0.01)

0.0446

D(LGDPPC)

-0.6733

(0.09)

0.0000

D(LGDPPC(-1))

0.3462

(0.16)

0.0341

D(LM2)
LFDI
LM2
LNGDP
E
ECM(-1)
Observations
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
Durbin-Watson

0.2972
(0.13)

0.0288

0.0320

(0.02)
0.0961
(0.04)
-0.1195
(0.05)
-0.0110
(0.02)
-0.2814
(0.13)

0.1056
0.0218
0.0202
0.5553
0.0347

49
0.72
0.67
2.03

Dependent variable is CPGDP from 2000Q1 to 2013Q2. The figures in parentheses are
standard errors.

IV.4

Policy Responses to Foreign Capital Inflows

Several studies have investigated the link between vulnerabilities and capital
inflows. As a result, central banks globally have adopted a spectrum of measures
to curb the tide especially, as it relates to overheating the system in terms of an
economy‘s capacity to absorb such flows, real currency appreciation, and
sudden stop or sharp reversal of inflows. Some of the measures canvassed in the
literature (Cardarelli, 2009), include exchange rate intervention, sterilisation of the
inflows, fiscal policy, and capital controls.
Against the background of the ―impossible trinity‖ doctrine, a major guiding
factor for ascertaining an appropriate exchange rate strategy to pursue would
be to establish the quantum of inflows and its implications for the appreciation of
the domestic currency. Thus, the size and structure of the inflows should guide the
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decision of whether or not to intervene in the market. A major consideration for
intervention is the concern that massive capital inflows may induce a steep
exchange rate appreciation in a short period, damaging the competitiveness of
export sectors and potentially reducing economic growth (Cardarelli, 2009).
Moreover, if net capital inflows take place in the context of a current account
deficit, the real appreciation could exacerbate the external imbalances,
heightening the vulnerability to a sharp reversal of capital inflows. To stem this
trend, some central banks accumulate reserves in order to keep the exchange
rate from appreciating. This policy may lead to lax monetary conditions, thus
creating the potential for overheating the economy and craeting financial
system vulnerabilities. In this case, real appreciation could occur via higher
inflation, rather than through an increase in nominal exchange rates. This is why
some authors have argued that it is more beneficial to allow the exchange rate
to fluctuate to discourage short-term speculative capital inflows by introducing
uncertainty on the changes in the value of the currency (Calvo et al., 1996).
Another area is the sterilisation of foreign receipts. The central bank could sterilise
the monetary impact of intervention through open market operations and,
change in the cash reserve requirement or transferring government deposits from
the banking system to the central bank as was done by the CBN in July 2013.
While the motives for sterilisation are clear, its effectiveness is less so and it could
entail substantial costs. Often times, sterilisation measures are designed to prevent
a decline in interest rates and maintain the incentives for continuing capital
inflows, thus perpetuating the problem. Moreover, sterilisation often implies quasifiscal costs, since it generally involves the central bank exchanging high-yield
domestic assets for low-yield reserves. Implementing sterilisation policy by
increasing unremunerated bank reserve requirements shifts the cost to the
banking system, thus, promoting financial disintermediation.
Thirdly, the use of fiscal policy to lessen the effects of capital flows on aggregate
demand and the real exchange rate during a surge of inflows and its
repercussions was examined. Kaminski et al, (2004), observed the pro-cyclical
nature of fiscal policy in emerging markets. They noted that a fast growing
economy generates revenues that feed into higher government spending, thus
aggravating the problem. By contrast, greater restraint on expenditure growth
has at least three benefits. First, by dampening aggregate demand during the
period of high inflows, it also allows lower interest rates than otherwise and could
therefore reduce incentives for inflows. Fiscal restraint alleviates the appreciating
pressures on the exchange rate directly, given the bias of public spending toward
non-traded goods (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1996). Third, to the extent
that it helps address or forestall debt sustainability concerns, it might provide
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greater scope for a counter-cyclical fiscal response to cushion economic activity
when the inflows stop. While discretionary fiscal tightening during a period of
capital inflows might be problematic due to political constraints and
implementation lags, the avoidance of fiscal excesses—holding the line on
spending—could play an important stabilisation role. In particular, fiscal rules
based on cyclically adjusted balances could help resist the political and social
pressures for additional spending in the face of large capital inflows.
Fourthly, is the case for enforcing controls over cross-border flows. In an attempt
to restrict the net inflow of capital, some jurisdictions have either imposed controls
on capital inflows or removed controls on capital outflows. The argument in the
literature is that some countries employ such control measures to attain a variety
of policy objectives; one of which is to discourage capital inflows in order to
reduce any tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate. Controls also
reduce the risk associated with the sudden reversal of inflows, and maintaining
some degree of monetary policy independence.

V.

Conclusions

This study set out to explore the links between international capital flows and
domestic credit growth, with a particular focus on understanding the Nigerian
experience. The study covered the period 2006-2012. This period witnessed an
unprecedented loosening of global monetary conditions, resulting in a rapid
decline in interest rates and spreads in most developing countries. It also
coincided with a rapid increase in capital inflows, domestic credit, and capitalmarket valuations throughout the developing world. The presence of large,
exogenous financial shocks suggests that it might be possible to estimate with
some confidence any underlying causal relationships. It is suggested that future
research in this area should investigate the link between foreign capital flows and
productive investment in developing countries.
The investigation revealed that the current account balances is not a reliable
variable in understanding the impact of foreign capital inflows and domestic
credit growth, in view of the strong asymmetry between net debt flows and net
equity flows. However, it is striking that portfolio flows appears to be the relevant
measure during the review period. This confirms the age long argument that FDIs,
especially multinational corporations, are by their nature, not designed to benefit
the recipient country. Rather, the FDI benefits more from the recipient country as
they provide employment and market outlets for their home countries. The results
are suggestive of leakages. For instance, some authors have argued that
financial-sector FDIs is substituted as debt inflows when a country is implementing
bond-inflow controls (Reinhardt and Deli‘Erba, 2013). The fact that FDI and CAB
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were a less significant capital flow than other types of foreign capital inflows in
this study, puts an interesting twist on previous studies in this area that have
argued that FDI flows into the financial sector may be related to macroeconomic
instability in the receiving countries (Ostry et al., 2011).
Despite the apparent empirical evidence of the relationship between portfolio
flows and domestic credit growth in Nigeria, the literature does not properly
capture the exact nature of this relationship. There is thus the need for more
empirical studies in this regard. Of importance, is the need to clearly appreciate
better, both the direct link between international debt flows and domestic credit
growth (for instance, through the international funding activities of domestic
banks) and the indirect relation (the impact of portfolio flows on domestic
macroeconomic and financial variables that can affect both supply and
demand factors influencing domestic credit. In turn, these findings have
implications for macro-prudential policy frameworks and the monitoring of ‗hot
money’. In particular, the finding indicates that there is strong evidence that
foreign capital inflows influence domestic credit growth. In terms of the
appropriate monetary policy response, it is recommended that policy-makers
should interpret domestic credit growth and external imbalances holistically.
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